Eleven percent of the U.K. population holds private health care insurance, and £2.2 billion are spent annually in the acute sector of private health care. Although isolated from policy discussions about new medical technology in the National Health Service, the private sector encounters these interventions regularly. During 18 months in one company, a new medical technology was encountered on average every week; 59 leading edge technologies were submitted for authorization (18 on multiple occasions). There are certain constraints on purchasers of health care in the private sector in dealing with new technology; these include fragmentation of the sector, differing rationalities within companies about limitations on eligibility of new procedures while competing for business, the role and expertise of the medical adviser, and demands of articulate customers. A proactive approach by the private sector to these challenges is hampered by its independence. Poor communication between the public and private sectors, and the lack of a more inclusive approach to policy centrally, undermine the rational diffusion and use of new medical technology in the U.K. health care system.
Of the 26,000 medical specialists who work in the U.K. National Health Service, over 75% do some work in the private sector and over 4,000 work regularly in private health care. The major clinical group receiving fees for services in private health care is of consultant/specialist status. This is the grade of doctor most likely to champion the diffusion of a new medical technology into practice. Funding in private health care is provided mainly via private medical insurance (PMI) companies; only 15% of people are self-financed. Currently 6.4 million people (11% of the U.K. population) are covered by private health care insurance (7) .
Insurance companies are facing the same upward pressure on health care costs in the private sector as in the public sector National Health Service (NHS). Expenditures on acute medical and surgical treatments in private hospitals have almost tripled from £392 million in 1986 to £1.12 billion in 1995, and from £25 million to £97 million in psychiatric hospitals in the same period (7) . Consequently the purchasing role of insurance companies has developed as they take an explicit view on matters such as quality of care, costs, and increasingly, the diffusion of new medical technologies.
Although there are now 33 companies underwriting private health care, a few are dominant. PPP healthcare, part of Axa Insurance, covers 34% of the private medical insurance (PMI) market in the United Kingdom, and some 19,000 medical specialists are recognized for benefit payment purposes to offer care to those subscribers. This paper aims to show the range of new technologies that could be identified in a defined time period among claims received by the PMI business of PPP healthcare. The process is not presented as an example of perfect decision making. Rather we aim to raise for discussion the internal and wider medical policy dilemmas that the process unearthed in a situation where preauthorization for individual patients waiting for the intervention enabled us to identify the process of diffusion early on.
OUR APPROACH TO THE DIFFUSION OF NEW MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES
In the U.K., the major PMI companies publish a schedule of procedures that explicitly defines those procedures eligible for benefit. The schedules cover eligible surgical, diagnostic, and some medical interventions and are updated, on average, every two years. Tests and interventions that have become standard practice in the U.K. public sector, or which good evidence indicates should be part of standard practice, are included in new versions, while outmoded procedures are removed.
All claims are initially assessed by personal advisers or senior claims assessors in the customer services department of the medical insurers. There are general written claims policies for the payment of benefit for nonroutine cases, the onward referral to nurse case managers, and finally, the medical doctors. In 1996, a specific policy for dealing with new medical technologies was approved by the PPP healthcare Group Board. A medical technology was defined in similar terms to those used in the NHS Health Technology Assessment Programme in the United Kingdom. This program commenced in 1991, forming the largest single portfolio with the NHS R&D Programme. Its focus is the public health care sector, although a wider perspective was muted in the founding principles (2) . The NHS R&D Programme itself, launched in 1991, aims to identify NHS requirements for research and knowledge, disseminate this knowledge to decision makers, and link the needs of the NHS with funding mechanisms. Research and development (R&D) networks have been established throughout the NHS connecting the service with the research base (9) .
Between September 1996, when the process of systematically identifying these technologies started in our company, and March 1998, all new medical technologies for which preauthorization was sought at least once were collected and catalogued. An important component of the policy on health technologies was that personal advisers and claims assessors contacted by any source about new and experimental procedures or interventions not in the Schedule of Procedures must seek authorization for benefit from the medical department at PPP healthcare. Furthermore, members' handbooks contain a rule that states that experimental treatment is not eligible, which this policy endorsed.
Diffusion of technologies in UK private sector
Against this, certain specialists and providers may have tried to short-circuit the communication of technologies that they perceived would be rejected as ineligible by coding the procedure as a closely related one in the schedule. This was more likely if the specialist fees were similar and no extra funding for the intervention was being sought. A variation of this follows:
Cardiac specialists at a London hospital wished to undertake a new cardiac procedure, transmyocardial laser revascularization. This treatment was being appraised in the U.K., and there was no dispute about its experimental status. However, a patient with end-stage cardiac failure was awaiting the procedure. The specialists and hospital were prepared to accept the fees and costs of a coronary artery bypass graft procedure and code the intervention as such on the claim form. Given the allowable costs in this case, the proposal raised an interesting discussion internally about whether the company, operating on the principles of indemnity insurance for its members, had a legitimate role in modifying the diffusion of new technologies. The lack of connection with the wider health sector was a definite disincentive to us to do so. Against this, we argued that the underlying principle of the rule on experimental treatment was to avoid the funding of treatments where the evidence was lacking or still under review as this could lead to the funding of ineffective care.
The Group Medical Director, on advice from the Director of Medical Policy, was responsible for decisions about funding these cases. The process was: a) appraising the published evidence; b) consulting with specialist advisers if further information was needed; and c) producing a briefing with the status of the technology and a recommendation for funding by the Director of Medical Policy. Files on each technology were registered on an internal database.
There were 59 new medical interventions for which authorization of funding was sought at least once in the 18-month period. For 18 (31%) interventions, funding was sought more than once, and for five of the 18 (27%, or 9% of the total) funding was sought more than five times. Table 1 shows these new technologies. There were three possible outcomes: no funding, funding in limited circumstances, and funding for all cases for which authorization was sought from here on. If the latter involved a surgical procedure, an additional issue was its inclusion in the next issue of the Schedule of Procedures. Almost three-quarters of the interventions were not funded, and in 16 cases funding was agreed on only under limited circumstances. A few surgical operations have been developed where the intervention is unpopular because of the time and expertise required and where large-scale trials will be unlikely. An example is deep lamellar keratoplasty on air. The decision was made to fund it on a named-surgeon basis. Cancer patients treated in recognized cancer centers and units as envisaged in the Calman/Hine report on cancer services (4) frequently are entered into trials, and if the protocols indicated multicenter trials and not merely personal research, it was agreed to fund such treatments on a named-patient basis. Five new procedures (mainly tests) were considered eligible for inclusion in a hospital contract in the future. Future funding for any intervention in Table 1 would only be agreed to after internal authorization in every instance.
PARTICULAR CHALLENGES FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Although only 59 were identified, these are leading edge interventions. Many interventions listed in a recent publication on new technologies (12) , such as magnetic resonance imaging and peripheral stem cell harvesting, were also encountered but were eligible because, as part of routine practice, they become incorporated into the next version of the published schedules. This causes quick upward pressure on .4) costs. It is quite unlike the public sector, where decisions by purchasers to fund a new intervention may be modified and delayed by considerations of the common good in a cash-limited system. The private sector does not provide comprehensive health care; for example, there is no general practice cover, and new customers with pre-existing conditions may be underwritten by exclusion from cover of those conditions. However, once eligible, that person can expect to receive the full range of interventions in routine practice in the specialty, including established new techniques. To add impetus to this, the case mix of claims submitted to PPP healthcare has changed over the past decade (Table 2) , and this has been noted throughout the private sector (13) . This is due to factors such as the older age of those insured, private provision in the public sector with more acute-type admissions, the willingness of those insured to seek more complex treatments privately due to pressures on the public sector, and the commercial influence of private hospitals. Hospitals will put pressure on insurance companies to fund new technologies that they perceive will give them a commercial advantage (11) . There has been a large expansion of private sector hospital provision in the United Kingdom since the 1980s, when the health care market was buoyant. However, the market has become markedly more sluggish in the 1990s, and therefore private hospitals are in a very competitive setting (7) . Hospitals in such environments use health technologies to change their case mix from an aesthetic and low complexity to high technology, particularly in diagnostics; tests are well represented in Table 1 . On occasion new technologies were detected via our "bill audit" nurses. These nurses, who usually have a background in surgical theater nursing, are employed to ensure that the bills submitted from hospitals are justified by the type of medical intervention. Several of the numerous new urological technologies in the treatment of benign prostatic hypertrophy (3) were detected only by these nurses. The main consumers of interest to innovators in high-cost technology are clinicians, hospital management, and funders (11) . The following is an example of pressure from commercial interests to fund more experimental techniques:
The Director of Medical Policy received a mail shot from a company involved in a new technology involving joint repair. Subsequently, she received a visit from a persistent marketing director. A discussion ensued about the evidence base for the technology, which is still evolving. The technology company does not sponsor research on evidence, but does sponsor the training abroad of selected and respected orthopedic surgeons to learn the required operative techniques. PPP healthcare declined to provide cover for the technology, and ascertained that other PMI companies were taking a similar line. The procedure was shown on a national media program about new medical developments. Subsequently several patients, including one in a high-paying corporate account, approached the company seeking cover for this procedure, stating that other insurance companies would pay. This was not the case and PPP healthcare continued to decline cover.
It is also clear that clinicians will use such technologies in their private practice. The majority of medical specialists in the United Kingdom practice jointly in the NHS and private sectors. If we assume that they do not practice radically differently in the two sectors-and many stated that they were already using the intervention in the NHS-it appears that there is no orderly process of diffusing many new techniques in the private or public sectors. Clinicians frequently agreed that definitive evidence was not yet available, but they were unwilling to wait some years while an apparently promising intervention passes their patients by. In private health care, this is all the more pressing because of the personal nature of the consultant-led service. A recent qualitative study has brought out the fundamental differences in perception between clinicians and purchasers, usually public health doctors, about the evidence needed to justify using a new technology (10) . Clinicians viewed "gold standard" evidence as of limited value in such decision making. It has been noted how few surgical interventions have been subjected to randomized controlled trials (5) , and surgery forms a large part of the work of the private sector.
Where good evidence exists, we have no idea how results apply accurately to everyday practices and patients in private health care in the United Kingdom (6) .
The evidence is the first but not the only consideration. Medical insurance companies cover an informed and articulate insured population who demonstrate that they wish to influence priorities in provision. Corporate clients may use their purchasing powers to force decisions on eligibility. Great care is needed under such pressure to ensure that there are not unfair inconsistencies in decision making. The pressure may come from within the company. Sales staff are driven by their own targets, and understandably may not appreciate the reasons for holding fast on certain demands relating to eligibility. Individual customers may be no less persistent, and this leads to dealings with the media directly related to evidence of effectiveness of interventions:
A consumer program had become interested in private insurance as a topic and over the course of nine months ran four items of "human interest" about apparent failure by various companies to cover interventions. The items on two of these directly related to failure to cover what were, in effect, interventions of poor evidence, one a leading edge surgical technique. This particular technique had been presented by the surgeon to the media as a breakthrough in treatment for the condition. It was presented by the program as a failure to fund a claim for a patient seeking the intervention on the advice of the surgeon. The patient described on the program who did have the operation subsequently also had a more routine intervention, a fact which was never made widely known.
The major private insurance company handbooks for members state that experimental treatments will not be funded. This proves difficult to explain to customers who assume wrongly that the decisions are cost-saving, particularly if their specialists are advocates of the technology.
CAN THE PRIVATE HEALTH CARE COMPANIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM INFLUENCE THE DIFFUSION OF NEW MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES?
The answer to this is not yet clear but will require a consistent approach from a sector that is fragmented and has no tradition of working as an entity. Its isolation from involvement in national policy decisions is a further disincentive to a proactive approach to a matter of national importance in health policy. More tension is about to enter the system with the publication of a framework for improving clinical quality and governance, aimed at the NHS (1). This framework proposes a National Institute of Clinical Excellence that will, among other initiatives, directly attempt to limit diffusion of certain interventions through centralized evidence-based guidance to providers on new interventions. This guidance will . . . protect patients from new interventions with inadequate evidence of clinical and costeffectiveness and ensure that interventions which are effective only in limited circumstances are appropriately used. (1) The impact of this effort in private health care is uncertain (there is one short paragraph about the private health care sector in a document of 86 pages). However, with such efforts to control the public sector, it is certainly in the interest of the total system that private health care does not become an "escape valve" for the more marginal technologies in medicine. It is interesting to speculate whether patients who can afford to, driven by media hype, will turn to private health care in the hopes of getting such interventions. The private sector should not fund procedures that demonstrate poor evidence of efficacy. It would be unacceptable if an ineffective technology, not available after assessment in the NHS, could be funded in the private sector either individually or as part of insurance coverage.
A study in the United States has shown that the experimental status of a technology is the most important factor in limiting its diffusion in private health care (8) , and this status strongly influenced our decisions on eligibility at PPP healthcare. However, there are also constraints on the purchasing function in the U.K. private sector. Decisions on medical technologies are time-consuming and require development of policy and considerable internal education of staff whose interests may lie elsewhere. The medical director may be a visiting adviser (a model used by some companies), and in the limited time available such issues may be perceived by these companies in a more ad hoc way. If the insurance company owns hospitals, there is added potential for a conflict of interests.
Research and development concerning the implication of technology diffusion in private health care and the outcomes of patients treated are required as urgently as in the public sector. Research is required into methods of communicating to the public a balanced argument about the value, risks, and costs of new medical technologies.
We recommend that the NHS R&D Health Technology Programme for New Medical Technologies link actively with the private health care sectors, particularly with the health care companies as purchasers. The private sector as a whole also needs to be proactive in this process so that the level of evaluation of medical technologies is at an equally high level.
